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THE LAW-AS I SEE IT

THE LAW-AS I SEE ITt
E. BAMutrr

PRETrymAN*

I suppose everyone who has written, taught or practiced law for
a quarter-century has formulated a philosophy of law. I venture to
phrase mine.
Law is the science of human relationships; or at least it is a part
of that science.
That sentence may be my own, or I may have read it somewhere;
but, in either event, it expresses precisely my idea. It seems an odd
idea, because we are accustomed to think of science as something
precise and law as just the opposite. The meaning of my thesis will
become clear if we develop first, briefly, the characteristics of science
and its difficulties.
Science, says the dictionary, is systematized knowledge. Sometimes
it is said that science is truth, but that is merely a pleasant arrogance
of lesser scientists. Science, as the real scientists know, is search
for truth. What is currently called scientific fact is really no more
than the best belief of the moment.
Much of accepted scientific fact is false, because scientists have
not yet learned the truth. Illustrations in proof of that proposition
troop to mind. For several thousand years, or longer, the scientific
fact was that the earth is flat; Columbus was a scientific eccentric.
Forty years ago, the chemistry books taught that there are ninety-two
irreducible species of matter, called elements. Our present notion is
that all matter is composed of electric charges and that the various
species of matter are merely varieties of number arrangement of the
charges in atoms. Until very recent years, medical authorities, including the pharmacopoeias, said that nicotinic acid was a deadly poison.
But today it is recognized as one of the vitamins and a specific for
pellagra. So we might go on indefinitely. Currently accepted scientific
fact is the best we know to date, but some of it is true and some of
it is not true. Science is the search for that which is true.
Some scientific facts are discovered and some are created by man.
Electricity was discovered, but the generation of electricity by a
whirling armature in a magnetic field and the conduction of the
energy by copper wire to a light bulb are scientific facts which were
tBased on an address delivered before the Washington and Lee chapter of
Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity.
*Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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invented by man. This proposition, like our first one, could be illustrated almost indefinitely. When man has discovered a natural fact,
he proceeds to use it or to nullify it, according to whether it is already
useful or whether it is adverse to his interests.
Advance in science takes one of two courses, the discovery of
natural truth or the production of a new fact. The facts of nature
have existed from the creation of the earth, but, of course, they do
not become part of science until they are discovered. The raw material
for radio waves existed in the time of the Babylonian Empire, and
so did the natural phenomena which support an airplane. Penicillin
has always existed. So scientific effort is in part the discovery of
unknown natural phenomena, in part the creation of processes for
the use of useful facts, and in part the creation of processes for overcoming adverse facts.
The present whole of every science consists of two parts, (1) the
application to daily problems of that which is the best presently
known on the subject and (2) the never-ceasing search for answers
not yet known. For example, engineers building an airplane must
do the best they can with what they know. They would like very
much to land the plane straight down, or start it straight up, but
they do not as yet know how, except to the limited capacity of the
present design of a helicopter. So they must design commercial planes
to take off and land on long runways. And, again, the zoologists
would like very much to eliminate the Japanese beetle and the
Mexican bean bug, but they do not as yet know how. So they must
do the best they can with poisons in limited areas, quarantines,
inspections and other makeshifts, the best they know.
The never-ceasing search for new answers to old problems has
two striking characteristics. One is the persistence of the search, and
the other is the reluctant caution with which a new discovery or
invention is accepted. Our friends, the doctors, are ever pressing for
new cures, but they are just as skeptical about adopting a new discovery as they are keen about making it. The scientific way of accepting a new answer is to try it out experimentally until it has been
proven. This balance between zealous searching for the new and
caution in its adoption is a characteristic of the truly scientific method.
One of the great difficulties faced by scientists is that they do not
know which of accepted scientific facts are true and which are not
true. Often we are startled by the news that some hitherto accepted
fact is not a fact at all. It is not now impossible for man to move
faster than sound. Pneumonia, once probably fatal, is no longer so.
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Cancer is today incurable, generally speaking, but scientific men are
sanguine that its cure lies merely in the field of undiscovered truth,
not in the field of the impossible. So, to a less poignant degree, are
the broadcast of color, and the preservation of teeth, and the distribution of food products. Science asserts as fact or accepted theory the
best of our knowledge to date, but which of it is true and which of
it is false we do not know; and even as to much which we believe to
be false, we do not know the truth.
Another great difficulty in the sciences is the selection and adoption of standards. Scientific determinations must be made by the application of standards, and until standards are established, science is
in confusion. Again, by way of example, time is measured from a
fixed geographical line; when the sun passes over that line, a new
day and date begins. Six and six make twelve because the basic unit
of the numerical system happens to be ten; if that unit had been
twelve, six and six would have been ten.
Now let us look at the law, its characteristics and its difficulties.
The law deals with human relationships. These are many and
varied. There are the relationships between man and man, between
man and woman, the family, partnerships, corporations, and finally
governments, small and great. They revolve about people and property,
actions and events. They involve an infinite variety of facts. They
are utterly simple and unutterably complex.
Those relationships must be arranged and controlled, lest chaos
be complete. The objective of these arrangements should be the wellbeing of mankind. What is good and what is ill for men is outside
the scope of our present inquiry, but we can agree that human relationships should be arranged to achieve the well-being of manlkind,
whatever that is. To that end there must be rules. Those rules are
the law.
That law is a science presupposes, of course, that there are true
and correct ultimate solutions to the problems of human relationships.
Of that I am firmly convinced. My own belief is that man was created
by an Intelligence, but even if that were not so, I would still believe
that animal-man can live in a state of maximum well-being, that that
state is definable, that man desires to achieve it, and that it is achievable. I do not believe that mankind is necessarily condemned to an
existence of disturbance, fear, oppression and economic want.
Some human relationships spring directly from natural physical
facts. Such are the relationship between the sexes, or the ownership
of physical property. Some relationships spring from natural non-
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physical facts. Such are love, honesty, hatred, greed, jealousy. Other
relationships are invented by men; such are future interests, negotiable
paper and corporations.
To attempt to ignore a fact is wholly futile. We may use a fact
or control it or suppress it, but we cannot ignore it. A law based upon
the proposition that one acre of land might be two acres, or that
two radio waves of the same frequency can be equally well heard at
the same time at a spot where they are of equal intensity, would be
futile. And this is true of intangible facts as it is of physical facts.
That murder and theft are wrong is just as much a fact as is the law
of gravity. That one man may cheat another is just as plain a fact
as that iron rusts in damp air. Any law that attempts to disregard
facts, whether tangible or intangible, is futile. At the same time, as
we have said, there are many human relationships which do not
involve natural facts. The double liability of a bank's stockholders
was an invention of man; it was not discovered, it was invented. As
such, it could be destroyed and thereafter ignored.
The whole of the law consists of two parts. One is the daily application of the best that is known, and the other is the unremitting
search for new and better answers. The law is not merely that which
has been established. The corporation, monogamy, and due process
of law once were new. Something new has been added to the law
from time to time, because the seeking mind of man discovered or
invented a better rule for the service of men's well-being. That process has not ceased. The mind of man has not atrophied. Quite the
contrary, more and more men, more and more actively, more and
more intelligently are seeking answers to the problems in this vast
labyrinth.
The adoption of that which is newly discovered or invented in
the law should be with the same caution with which scientists in
other fields accept the new. And lawyers have an additional peculiar
obstacle to the adoption of the new. A legal problem usually involves
not one person and his rights but two or more persons and their
relative rights, and the answer to the problem usually denies to one
that which it is affirming to another. So the adoption of a new solution after rights have accrued to one or the other of the parties
usually involves a denial of the right already established. But when
the new solution is not adopted retroactively by court decision but
prospectively by legislative enactment, that difficulty is not encountered. Moreover, an established rule may in the course of the years,
by the occurrence of events and change of customs, etc., become an
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instrument of injustice rather than of justice; and so rights which
now accrue under it may be inherently invalid and can be declared
so. The point is that keen search for the new and better and extreme
caution in adopting the new are not inconsistent. Together they
constitute the truly scientific process; in the law as in every other
science.
The difficulties and problems of the law are pretty much the
same as those of other sciences. We know quite a bit, but we know
that we do not know so much more. As a matter of fact, we are
not certain of all the elements which make up the objective toward
which we are striving. Some of the elements which constitute the
well-being of mankind are known and generally accepted as such;
for example, peace, justice and economic sufficiency. But many of
the elements of human well-being are not known, and as to many
others there are violent and conflicting theories.
Quite obviously, some of the answers which we seek have been
found, and, equally obviously, some of them have not been. And some
of the answers which have been accepted as correct are not correct.
That a man should not steal is obviously a correct rule. But that
nations should solve differences of opinion or of interest by slaughtering their prime specimens of physical and mental excellence is obviously an incorrect rule. And some other rules are obviously in a mere
state of perplexity. The relationship between a man and a woman is
one. Time was when a man had numerous wives and also had concubines. Then came monogamy, protected by rigid divorce requirements
but supplemented by publicly protected prostitution. More recently,
the latter has been more and more curbed in this country, and divorce
requirements have been more and more relaxed. So that, generally and
not too precisely speaking, the present effect of the rules is that a man
may have as many wives as he pleases but only one at a time, and
intercourse between the sexes, except in the marital state, is forbidden. It would be silly for one to say that we have discovered the
correct rule in this area of human relationships. There are forty-nine
sets of rules in this country alone.
Many, many other problems in the law are as yet unanswered.
We have not solved the problems of crime prevention, or of commercial regulation, or of juvenile delinquency, or of the ownership
of property, or the distribution of products, and many more. We
do the best we can with what we presently know, but we know that
the truth is not yet known. Men are still searching for the answers.
Another great difficulty in the law is the selection and adoption
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of standards. For example, the correct rule which should govern
some human relationships depends upon the ultimate nature of man
himself. One of these is government. If man is a creature evolved by
circumstance a few steps after the fish and the birds, government
would seem to be merely a self-protective compact. If man is the
creation of a supernatural Intelligent Being and is endowed by that
Creator with natural rights, government would seem to be a necessary
implementation of that endowment and so not susceptible of lawful
antagonism toward those rights. If the Intelligent Creator of the
universe has selected one human being and empowered him to rule
over a group, tribe, nation or race-the divine rights of kings-government would seem to be the will of that person. Lacking absolute knowledge upon the ultimate nature of man, we have great
difficulty, even bloody wars, trying to fix the rules as to this most
complex of human relationships, government. The best we can do
is to establish a theory as our standard and measure by that. The
same difficulty exists as to many other human relationships. The
necessity for standards is as great in the law as it is in other fields.
The great difficulty is to establish standards that are true and sound.
The principal point of my thesis is that the law is not dead. It
is alive. It is not an ancient language like classic Greek, the conjugation of the improper verbs of which is to be learned by rote and
repeated parrot-like in answer to questions. It is not even a delightful
literature of the past to be read for interest and studied for style.
The law is the process of dealing with actual, present, live problems
of human beings and their activities. Full comprehension of the law
is not acquired by memory; the law requires the application of
intelligence to the raw material of people and events.
Let me come closer to reality. Cases are not quiz program questions the answers to .which are in a book somewhere. They are problems, mostly having to do with the relationships of human beings.
A divorce case is not a compendium of plagiarized papers and stereotyped pronouncements. It is a complex problem of human relationships, the intricacies of human behavior, the requirements of a
pressing society, the future of children, etc., etc. A will is not a jumble
of unintelligible Seventeenth Century obscurities taken from a book. A
will is usually the climactic act of a person's whole lifetime effort. The
drawing of the simplest will, properly approached, is a problem in
human relationships of the most intricate and delicate sort. A man
wants to leave all his property to his wife. A flood of questions is
unloosed by that simple idea, if the lawyer is the scientist he ought
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to be. The fact is that the carelessness with which many lawyers
permit hard-working, thrifty people to toss out the window, or into
the outstretched hands of unscrupulous volunteers posing as advisers
or investors, or into the maw of consuming litigation, the sweatstained savings of a lifetime is appalling. An architect who drew
plans for a building with care proportionate to the sad process of
many lawyers drawing wills would be barred from practice long
before he starved to death or was prosecuted. The same is true in
respect to the drawing of contracts, the trial of lawsuits, and the
argument of cases. The work of a lawyer is a series of problems, no
two exactly alike, which concern the relationships of human beings,
some simple and some bafflingly complex.
You hear people say, "He ought to make a good lawyer. He argues
so well." What silly nonsense! He will make a good lawyer if he has
stored in his mind the thought of past generations upon the topic
at hand, has the vitality to keep abreast of that which is new and
proven, can analyze and appraise people and their problems, and
has the wisdom to formulate and apply the best available answer to
the problem put to him. He may not thus make the biggest headlines,
any more than do the foremost scientists in any branch of science;
but he will make the best lawyer.
To say that the law is what the Supreme Court says it is depends
for accuracy upon a narrow definition of "law." That Court changes
its views, as we all know. And Congress may change the rule which
the Court has announced, and the people may change the Congress
and so again change the rule. There is, of course (because there must
be), a present state of the law, composed of the rules which are presently established. They are the rules which must be followed in the
absence of anything better. And, moreover, for the very necessary
purpose of concluding specific controversies, an applicable rule must
be declared in each dispute. In that sense, what any court in a final
decision says is the law is the law. It is the law of that case and is an
authoritative expression of the rule as presently best known. But
the view of a temporary majority of two out of three or of five out of
nine men cannot permanently make the law in a general sense. A
mighty combination of many minds, much character, and vast experience evolves the law.
It is a major mistake, indeed a tragedy, for lawyers, particularly
young lawyers, to have the idea that what has been established is the
whole of the law. Much of the best of the law to date is that which
has been added in comparatively recent times. Trial by jury is better
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than trial by ordeal. The abolition of human slavery was good. The
best of the law is yet to be discovered. However cautious we must
and should be in adopting for general use new inventions, we must
be, at the same time and equally, keen for the discovery and invention of that which is better.
The whole of the law is the whole of the truth as to human relationships. So, in part it is the application of that which has thus far
been established, and in part it is the search for that truth which
has not yet been discovered. The law, in my view, is the science of
human relationships.
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